A well-written account of a fascinating episode in the life of President Theodore Roosevelt which resonates with modern-day issues ranging from the destruction of the rainforest and its indigenous inhabitants, climate change and the extinction of animal and plant species, the pressures put on sensitive eco-systems by first-world adventure tourism, and the crushing impact of toxic masculinity.
The most obvious conclusion to be drawn from Roosevelt's poorly planned 1914 expedition along Brazil's Rio da Duvida, the River of Doubt, is that it was a miracle that it wasn't an even greater disaster. As it was, three men died, the survivors suffered great hardships due to poorly-thought-out equipment and provisions, and Roosevelt himself probably died prematurely, within a few years, because of the privations and injuries he suffered.
And, as Millard makes clear, it shouldn't have taken a crystal ball to see that this would be the outcome: Roosevelt --too busy glad-handing South America politicians, and sulking over his defeat by Woodrow Wilson in the 1912 election-- delegated the planning and provisioning of the expedition to incompetents. With the attention-span of a Mayfly, he changed plans, and (crucially!) the itinerary, at the last moment. Decisions were made on the strength of manly "gut-feelings" and pure prejudice, instead of science and good management.
Millard recounts an interesting story, but also provides the fine detail -- about Amazonia, about Roosevelt as a person, and about his family, about the bit players in the debacle -- that convinces me why it really matters, and how it applies to the present day.
The most obvious conclusion to be drawn from Roosevelt's poorly planned 1914 expedition along Brazil's Rio da Duvida, the River of Doubt, is that it was a miracle that it wasn't an even greater disaster. As it was, three men died, the survivors suffered great hardships due to poorly-thought-out equipment and provisions, and Roosevelt himself probably died prematurely, within a few years, because of the privations and injuries he suffered.
And, as Millard makes clear, it shouldn't have taken a crystal ball to see that this would be the outcome: Roosevelt --too busy glad-handing South America politicians, and sulking over his defeat by Woodrow Wilson in the 1912 election-- delegated the planning and provisioning of the expedition to incompetents. With the attention-span of a Mayfly, he changed plans, and (crucially!) the itinerary, at the last moment. Decisions were made on the strength of manly "gut-feelings" and pure prejudice, instead of science and good management.
Millard recounts an interesting story, but also provides the fine detail -- about Amazonia, about Roosevelt as a person, and about his family, about the bit players in the debacle -- that convinces me why it really matters, and how it applies to the present day.
